In the first part the military and economic strength of Russia in the nineteenth century is examined. The interrelationship of such factors as demographics; size and effectiveness of army and navy personnel; capacity of the armaments industry to produce small arms, artillery, and ships; availability of raw materials and provisions; efficiency of the supply and transportation systems; and the organization of system of defense are investigated.
In the second part the military and naval strategy and tactics of the Russian armed forces in the nineteenth century are examined. The author does not attempt to survey everything related to Russia's armed forces but restricts himself to the most important matters.
This book describes the economic base on which the armed forces of the country developed and shows how its military and economic strength changed with the transition from a feudal-serf society to a bourgeois one. It also examines the influence of new values on military and naval strategy as well as the ways in which the army and navy affected the economic development of the country.
The book consists of a series of essays so that particular issues and their implications can be dealt with separately.
The research is based on a wide range of sources, primarily the archives concentrated in the Central State Historical Archive, Central State Archive of Ancient Documents, Central State Naval Archive, Central State Archive of the October Revolution, and in the manuscript sections of the State Historical Museum, and Lenin Library, and on materials published in collections of documents as well as investigations into specific questions of military history.
The development of military capacity, as Engels points out, depends "on material, that is, economic circumstances, on human resources, and weapons, which, in turn, depend on the quality and size of a nation's population and on its technology." Without examining these factors no light can be shed on the organization and personnel of a nation's armed forces or on its military policy and strategy. In an immense country like Russia demographic factors are of particular significance. In the nineteenth century Russia was the most powerful state in Europe. With its huge population it could support a numerically significant army. In the pre-emancipation period its male population increased from 18,707,100, of which 14,075,000 were on the tax rolls and subject to compulsory military service, to 29,450,000, of which 19,790,000 were on the tax rolls in 1833, and to 37,520,000, of which 23,103,000 were on the tax rolls by 1857. The overall male population increased by 18,813,000 in less than 50 years, but only 9,028,000 of this additional manpower was subject to military service.
After the 1861 reforms an even more rapid increase in the male population occurred. In 1870 there were 42,569,800 males, by 1885, 54,393,500, by 1897, 64,500,000 and in 1900, 66,480,000. These data show that the male population increased by 39,480,200 between 1857 and 1900.
This significant population increase provided a much larger pool of able-bodied and efficient manpower for the armed forces than in the first half of the century. In the pre-reform period, given the system of obtaining conscripts in effect at the time, the army constantly suffered from a severe shortage of men. Serfdom made it extremely difficult to transform the army from the semi-feudal organization it was at that time into a modern, bourgeois army. Conscription quotas of four men per thousand males in peacetime and eight in wartime were set by the government. Attempts by the Ministry of War to increase these quotas elicited extreme displeasure from landowners who did not wish to have their unpaid labor force reduced. It was also impossible for the government to reduce the period of service and still obtain an adequate reserve of trained manpower. In crisis situations the government had no alternative but call up the national militia.
Only by introducing universal conscription could the overwhelming majority of the male population be inducted into the armed forces and a reserve of trained manpower established. There was no alternative to using men trained during short periods of service if a mass army was to be fielded in time of war.
An equally serious problem was posed by the characteristics of the population. Before 1861 the population liable to poll tax was subject to military service although a number of categories was excluded from such service. The nobility, clergy, and merchant class, encompassing a significant number of people, were freed directly or indirectly from any military obligation.
The Ministry of War had to take this factor into account until the military reforms of 1874. Table 1 shows the composition of the population by estate not subject to military service during the first half of the nineteenth century.
The extension of obligation for military service to all estates involved a redefinition of the categories of the population to which it applied. Whereas the number of men subject to conscription into the army and navy increased, the number of new exemptions prevented the system from becoming truly universal.
The nationalities question played a most important role in the shaping of the army and navy. In multi-national Russia only Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians were drafted into the army and navy. Among the other nationalities some (Finns, Poles) served in accordance with special regulations or were formed into irregular units (Bashkirs, Kalmyks). The cossacks also served under special regulations.
The main obligation for military service fell on peasants and workers. The overwhelming predominance of peasants in the country's population was reflected in the composition of the army. Until almost the end of the nineteenth century its enlisted component consisted almost entirely of peasants. Only during the last quarter of the century, did the number of workers begin to increase.
In the first half of the century the proportion of peasants to workers was: in 1804, 17,280,300 peasants (males), 95,200 workers; in 1825, 19,250,000 peasants (males), 210,600 workers; in 1851, 23,350,500 peasants (males) and the number of workers had increased to 465,000.
The really significant change in the proportion of peasants to workers occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century upon the dramatic increase in the number of workers. In 1863 there were 24,204,900 peasants (males) and 565,000 workers; in 1885, 37,471,500 peasants and 1,240,000 workers, and in 1897, 45,517,500 peasants and 2,098,300 workers. The army and navy gradually acquired a new character. The enlisted component ceased to be completely peasant. New strategies and tactics in the conduct of both land and sea warfare required men capable of using modern artillery weapons, conducting engineering operations, and operating modern ships.
The officer component was drawn from the nobility. The nobles jealously barred the other estates from access to command appointments in the armed forces. During wars the government had no alternative but to augment the officer corps from the other estates. In accordance with Peter the Great's law, individuals promoted to officer rank were granted the status of hereditary nobility. This was confirmed by the letters patent in 1785. The significant inflow into the officer corps of representatives of the other estates, which occurred during the many wars of the early part of the nineteenth century, caused considerable concern in ruling circles. In trying to prevent "contamination" the government imposed limitations on grants of hereditary nobility. The first related decree was issued in 1845, specifying that only staff officers be granted hereditary nobility. Ten years later a decree specified that hereditary nobility was received with the rank of full colonel or captain (first class) in the navy. These restrictions did not prevent senior and staff officers from being granted personal nobility.
The government continued to apply policies clearly based on class interests even after the 1874 military reforms. Tsarism imposed some constraints on reform of the military system in the interest of retaining its dominance over it. Class bias was reflected in the organization of the armed forces, their equipment, uniforms, and training methods.
L.B. Beskrovny
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